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I. INTRODUCTION 
Congress’s legislative authority is normally limited to its 
enumerated powers under Article I of the Constitution. However, the 
Supreme Court’s decision in Missouri v. Holland1 muddled the 
limitations imposed by Article I when Congress passes legislation 
implementing a federal treaty. In Bond v.United States,2 the Supreme 
Court will revisit Holland and have the opportunity to definitively 
dictate Congress’s powers when implementing a valid federal treaty. 
Decided over ninety years ago, Missouri v. Holland, is the seminal 
case on the extent of the Congressional treaty power. It involved a 
challenge to the constitutionality of the Migratory Bird Treaty 
Implementation Act (MBTA).3  The MBTA was passed by Congress 
to meet the United States’ obligations to protect migratory birds in 
the United States and Canada.4 The MBTA accomplished this by 
making it unlawful to kill, capture, or sell any migratory birds 
protected by the Act.5 
In Holland, the State of Missouri challenged the constitutionality 
 
* J.D. Candidate 2015, Duke University School of Law. 
 1.  252 U.S. 416 (1920). 
 2.   No. 12-158 (U.S. argued Nov. 10, 2013). 
 3.  See Migratory Bird Treaty Act, 16 U.S.C.A. §§ 703–710 (West 2013). 
 4.  Convention between the United States and Great Britain for the Protection of 
Migratory Birds, U.S.-Gr. Brit., Aug. 16, 1916, 39 Stat. 1702.  
 5.  16 U.S.C.A. § 703(a) (West 2013).  
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of the MBTA by claiming that it infringed on rights reserved to the 
states under the Tenth Amendment.6 To decide whether or not the 
MBTA’s restrictions violated states’ rights, the Court had to look 
beyond the Tenth Amendment because “by Article 2, Section 2, the 
power to make treaties is delegated expressly, and by Article 6 
treaties . . . are declared the supreme law of the land.”7 Therefore, the 
Court stated that if a treaty “is valid there can be no dispute about the 
validity of the statute under Article I, Section 8, as a necessary and 
proper means to execute the powers of the Government.”8 
The Court found that the underlying treaty did not violate any 
express provision of the Constitution, and then sought to determine 
whether the underlying treaty was “forbidden by some invisible 
radiation” from the Tenth Amendment.9 In rejecting Missouri’s 
argument, the Court found that the states alone could not adequately 
protect migratory birds.10 Instead, the Court found that the protection 
of migratory birds was indeed a “national interest of . . . the first 
magnitude” and held the underlying treaty valid and thus the MBTA 
constitutional.11 
Nearly one hundred years later, Bond v. United States raises an 
important and unanswered constitutional question after Holland: 
What exactly is the limit to Congress’s powers when implementing a 
non-self-executing treaty?  
II. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
On January 13, 1993, the United States entered into a treaty that 
sought to achieve “effective progress towards general and complete 
disarmament under strict and effective international control.”12 The 
Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, 
Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and their Destruction (the 
Convention) was a non-self-executing treaty that hoped to achieve 
either the prohibition or elimination of all weapons of mass 
 
 6.  252 U.S. 416, 431 (1920). The Tenth Amendment states “[t]he powers not delegated to 
the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the 
States respectively, or to the people.” U.S. CONST. amend. X. 
 7.  Holland, 252 U.S. at 431. 
 8.  Id. at 432. 
         9.    Id. at 434. 
 10.  Id. at 435.  
 11.  Id.  
 12.  United Nations: Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, 
Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and their Destruction, Preamble, Jan. 13, 1993, 32 
I.L.M. 800 [hereinafter the Convention]. 
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destruction.13 As such, the Convention forbade all parties to it from 
creating, using, or encouraging the use of chemical weapons.14 In 
particular, the Convention included a Verification Annex that listed a 
variety of prohibited toxic chemicals.15 
Accordingly, Congress passed the Chemical Weapons Act, § 229 of 
which made it illegal for any person to “develop, produce . . . use, or 
threaten to use, any chemical weapon.”16 
Sixteen years after the United States entered into the Convention, 
Carol Anne Bond discovered that her best friend, Myrlinda Haynes, 
was pregnant and that Bond’s husband was the baby’s father.17 Bond 
sought revenge.18 She stole 10–chloro10H–phenoxarsine from Rohm 
& Haas, the chemical manufacturer where she was employed as a 
microbiologist, and also ordered potassium dichromate over the 
Internet.19 Both chemicals can cause physical harm through minimal 
topical contact.20 
Over the next several months, Bond spread the chemicals over 
Haynes’ car and mailbox making 24 attempts to poison Haynes 
overall.21 For the most part, Haynes was able to avoid touching the 
chemicals, with the exception of once suffering a burn to her thumb.22 
Finally, Haynes informed the local police about the situation.23 The 
police merely advised her to wipe the substances off.24 Unsatisfied 
with the police’s response, Haynes reported the matter to the local 
postal carriers, who then referred the matter to the United States 
Postal Inspection Service (USPIS).25 
 
 13.  Id. Non-self-executing treaties grant Congress the power to make changes in domestic 
law in order to implement the provisions of the treaty, while self-executing treaties do not 
require any enforcing legislation. Jeffrey L. Friesen, The Distribution of Treaty-Implementing 
Powers in Constitutional Federations: Thoughts on the American and Canadian Models, 94 
COLUM. L. REV. 1415, 1450 n.3 (1994). The Convention is a non-self-executing treaty because it 
has been assumed that a treaty creating a federal crime requires Congress to enact legislation 
before any individual could be punished. Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law § 111 
cmt. f (1987). 
 14.  The Convention, supra note 12 at art. I.  
 15.  Id. at annex. 
 16.  18 U.S.C.A. § 229(a)(1) (West 2013).  
 17.  United States v. Bond, 581 F.3d 128, 131 (3d Cir. 2009). 
 18.  Id. 
 19.  Id. 
 20.  Id. at 131–32. 
 21.  Id. at 132. 
 22.  Id. 
 23.  Id. 
 24.  Id. 
 25.  Id. 
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The USPIS placed surveillance cameras throughout Haynes’ 
property, which caught Bond planting the chemicals.26 Bond was 
arrested and a grand jury in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 
indicted her on two counts of possessing and using a chemical weapon 
in violation of § 229 of The Chemical Weapons Act.27 
Bond claimed that § 229 violated principles of federalism and 
moved to dismiss the charges.28 The district court denied Bond’s 
motions, and she pled guilty to all charges. Bond was sentenced to six 
years in prison,29  but she reserved her right to appeal.30 On appeal to 
the Third Circuit, Bond again argued that § 229 violated the 
Constitution by allowing the federal government to legislate in areas 
of law reserved to the states under the Tenth Amendment.31 Before 
reaching Bond’s federalism argument, however, the Third Circuit held 
that Bond lacked standing to bring a Tenth Amendment challenge 
because her suit lacked any representation by a state or its officers.32 
The Third Circuit then affirmed the District Court’s sentence.33 
On appeal, the Supreme Court solely confronted the standing 
issue and stated that “[a]n individual has a direct interest in objecting 
to laws that upset the constitutional balance between the National 
Government and the States . . . . Fidelity to principles of federalism is 
not for the States alone to vindicate.”34 Thus finding that Bond had 
standing, the Court remanded the case to the Third Circuit.35 
On remand, Bond again argued that § 229, as applied to her, was 
an unconstitutional violation of the  Tenth Amendment because it 
allowed the federal government to intrude on a state’s right to punish 
assaults.36 In denying Bond’s claims, the Third Circuit relied heavily on 
Holland’s holding that if a treaty “is valid there can be no dispute 
about the validity of the [implementing] statute under Article 1, 
Section 8, as a necessary and proper means to execute the powers of 
the Government.”37 The Third Circuit said that Holland stands for the 
 
 26.  Id. 
 27.  Id. 
 28.  Id. 
 29.  Id. 
 30.  Id. at 133.  
 31.  Id. at 134.  
 32.  Id. at 137. 
 33.  Id. at 142.  
 34.  Bond v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2355, 2364 (2011). 
 35.  Id. at 2367.  
 36.  United States v. Bond, 681 F.3d 149, 153 (3d Cir. 2012). 
 37.  252 U.S. 416, 432 (1920). 
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proposition that “when there is a valid treaty, Congress has [the] 
authority to enact implementing legislation under the Necessary and 
Proper Clause, even if it might otherwise lack the ability to legislate in 
the domain in question.”38 The Third Circuit then held the Convention 
to be a valid treaty because it dealt with a matter of international 
concern.39 
Although the Third Circuit followed Holland in noting that a valid 
treaty grants Congress powers under the Necessary and Proper 
Clause to enact it, this did not end the inquiry.40 The court noted that § 
229 must still meet the “Necessary and Proper Clause’s general 
requirement that legislation implemented under that Clause be 
‘rationally related to the implementation of a constitutionally 
enumerated power.’”41 The court found such rational relation, 
observing that § 229 closely follows the language of the Convention 
and did not disrupt the balance between federal and state authority.42 
The Third Circuit then re-affirmed Bond’s sentence,43 and the 
Supreme Court granted certiorari.44 
III. LEGAL BACKGROUND 
The Holland Court held that Congress may use the Necessary and 
Proper Clause to implement a treaty even if the implementing 
legislation would otherwise be beyond Congress’s Article I powers.45 
With its second holding, Holland created confusion concerning the 
breadth of the Necessary and Proper Clause when used by Congress 
to pass legislation implementing a federal treaty. 
The Necessary and Proper Clause states that Congress has the 
power “to make all laws which shall be necessary and proper for 
carrying into the execution . . . all . . . powers vested by this 
Constitution.”46 In McCulloch v. Maryland, the Supreme Court held 
that laws are “necessary and proper” as long as the end is legitimate 
and within the scope of the Constitution and the means are plainly 
 
 38.  Bond, 681 F.3d at 157. 
 39.  Id. at 161–62.  
 40.  252 U.S at 432. 
 41.  Bond, 681 F.3d at 157 (quoting United States v. Comstock, 560 U.S. 126 (2010)).  
 42.  Id. at 165–66.  
 43.  Id. at 166. 
 44.  Bond v. United States, No. 12-158 (U.S. argued Nov. 10, 2013).  
 45.  Holland. 252 U.S. at 432. 
 46.  U.S. CONST. Art. I, § 8.  
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adapted to reach that end.47 In determining whether the McCulloch 
test is met, courts look to whether a statute is “rationally related to 
the implementation of a constitutionally enumerated power.”48 
Therefore, when the Court held in Holland that if a treaty “is valid 
there can be no dispute about the validity of the statute under Article 
I, Section 8, as a necessary and proper means to execute the powers of 
the Government,”49 the implication was that a statute implementing a 
valid treaty automatically passes the McCulloch test. Consequently, 
courts have sometimes cited Holland as standing for the proposition 
that the Tenth Amendment is not a barrier to Congress’ powers when 
implementing a valid treaty.50 For example, in United States v. Lue, the 
Second Circuit stated that “[i]f the Hostage Taking Convention is a 
valid exercise of the Executive’s treaty power, there is little room to 
dispute that the legislation passed to effectuate the treaty is valid 
under the Necessary and Proper Clause.”51 
Recent decisions of the Supreme Court have pushed back 
interpreting Holland as standing for the proposition that Congress 
has unfettered powers when implementing a valid federal treaty. For 
example, in Reid v. Covert, the Court stated that “no agreement with a 
foreign nation can confer power on the Congress, or on any other 
branch of Government, which is free from the restraints of the 
Constitution.”52 Despite the Court’s statements in Reid, the lower 
courts have refused to “reject the broader interpretation that has 
been given to Missouri v. Holland” and instead dismiss any 
constitutional issues “by noting that the challenged act of Congress 
was enacted as a ‘necessary and proper’ means of giving effect to a 
treaty.”53 Such was the district court’s position in Bond when it denied 
Bond’s motions and agreed with the government’s argument that the 
Chemical Weapons Act was a valid constitutional exercise of 
 
 47.  17 U.S. 316, 421 (1819). 
 48.  United States v. Comstock, 560 U.S. 126, 134 (2010). 
 49.   252 U.S. 416, 432 (1920). 
 50.  Supreme Court Grants Certiorari in Case Implicating Missouri v. Holland, 107 AM. J. 
INT'L L. 432, 433 (2013). 
 51.  134 F.3d 79 (2d Cir. 1998); see also United States v. Ferreira, 275 F.3d 1020, 1028 (11th 
Cir. 2001) (“We agree with the Second Circuit's analysis and conclusion that ‘the Hostage 
Taking Convention is well within the boundaries of the Constitution's treaty power,’ and 
similarly conclude that Congress had authority under the Necessary and Proper Clause to enact 
the Hostage Taking Act.”). 
 52.  354 U.S. 1, 16 (1957). 
 53.  John C. Eastman, Will Mrs. Bond Topple Missouri v. Holland?, CATO SUP. CT. REV., 
185, 200 (2010–11). 
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Congress’ authority under the Necessary and Proper Clause.54 
Academics have also joined the debate concerning the proper 
interpretation of Holland and Congress’s powers when implementing 
a valid federal treaty.  Professor Nicholas Rosenkranz provided a 
unique outlook when he combined the language of the Treaty Clause 
with the Necessary and Proper Clause to read as follows: “[t]he 
Congress shall have Power . . . To make all Laws which shall be 
necessary and proper for carrying into Execution . . . [the President’s] 
Power, by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, to make 
Treaties.”55 Using this reading of the Treaty Clause and the Necessary 
and Proper Clause, Rosenkranz argued that the Necessary and Proper 
Clause simply grants Congress the power to “make treaties.”56 
Rosenkranz contended that the term of art “make treaties” does not 
include the power to give existing treaties domestic legal effect,57 but 
rather allows Congress to create laws that would assist the national 
government in entering into treaties.58 For example, the power to 
“make treaties” would certainly include “laws appropriating money 
for the negotiation of treaties”59 or it could grant Congress the power 
to implement legislation that would “ensure the wise use” of the 
treaty power.60 Therefore, Rosenkranz determined that Holland’s 
statement that if a treaty “is valid there can be no dispute about the 
validity of the statute under Article I, Section 8, as a necessary and 
proper means to execute the powers of the Government”61 is wrong 
and thus Holland should be overruled.62 
 
 
 
 54.  United States v. Bond, 681 F.3d 149, 152 (2012). 
 55.  Nicholas Quinn Rosenkranz, Executing the Treaty Power, 118 HARV. L. REV. 1867, 
1882 (2005) (quoting U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18; U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2).  
 56.  Id. at 1884.  
 57.  Id.  
 58.  Id.  
 59.  Id. at 1882. 
 60.  Id. at 1883. 
 61.   252 U.S. 416, 432 (1920). 
 62.  Rosenkranz, supra note 55, at 1868. 
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IV. ARGUMENTS 
A. Petitioner’s Arguments 
1. The Treaty Power Does Not Grant a Federal Police Power 
Bond first argues that Congress does not have the power to 
criminalize every malicious use of a chemical under 18 U.S.C.A. § 
229.63 Allowing Congress to do so would create a federal police power 
antithetical to the Aritcle I, § 8 enumerated powers.64 Bond argues 
that the Constitution reserved the police power to the states,65 and 
that the federal government’s lack of a police power is a bedrock 
principle of federalism that protects state sovereignty and individual 
liberty.66 Part of maintaining an appropriate balance between state 
and federal powers, Bond argues, means assuring that Congress 
cannot regulate criminal conduct that is not of a national or 
international concern.67 Allowing the Third Circuit’s reading of 
Holland to stand would thus create a “loophole through which 
Congress can circumvent the limits on its enumerated powers.”68 
Therefore, Bond argues that the government’s reading of Holland 
that “any legislation rationally implementing a valid treaty is a valid 
exercise of the Necessary and Proper Clause”69 “cannot be the law.”70  
Additionally, Bond asserts that the Third Circuit’s reading of 
Holland is not only constitutionally impermissible, but that it also 
contradicts the Court’s opinion in Holland.71 Bond notes that in 
deciding the constitutionality of the MBTA, the Holland Court 
balanced relevant state and national interests before deeming the 
national interests paramount.72 This weighing of national and state 
interests would have been “largely beside the point if federalism 
principles were simply irrelevant when the federal government acts 
pursuant to the treaty power.”73 Therefore, Bond argues that Holland 
 
 63.  Brief for Petitioner at 20, Bond v. United States, No. 12-258 (U.S. May 8, 2013). 
 64.  Id. 
 65.  Id. 
 66.  Id. at 21. 
 67.  Id. at 22.  
 68. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 33, Bond v. United States, No. 12-158 (U.S. Aug. 1, 
2012). 
 69.  Brief for Petitioner, supra note 63, at 28. 
 70.  Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 68, at 24. 
 71.  Id. at 24–25.  
 72.  Id. at 25. 
 73.  Brief for Petitioner, supra note 63, at 29. 
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is consistent with the proposition that the Treaty Power is subject to 
federalism restrictions.74 
2. The Third Circuit’s Holding Undermines the Existence of Non-
self-executing Treaties 
Bond contends that the government’s theory that “any valid treaty 
necessarily expands Congress’s plenary power is also difficult to 
reconcile with the critical distinction between self-executing and non-
self-executing treaties.”75 A self-executing treaty’s validity would be 
the proper focus of inquiry by the Third Circuit because if it were 
valid, the Supremacy Clause renders it the supreme law of the land 
without any further action by Congress.76 
A non-self-executing treaty, on the other hand, is “different.”77 
Bond argues that the Senate ratifies a non-self executing treaty when: 
(1) state law can assure that the United States is in compliance with 
the treaty, or (2) “with the understanding that state and federal laws” 
are currently sufficient to deal with the United States’ obligations 
under the treaty.78 Accordingly, Bond argues that the President and 
the Senate enter into non-self-executing treaties precisely because 
they are wary of the federalism implications and purposely preserve 
the States’ role in helping to ensure that treaty obligations are met.79 
Thus, the Third Circuit’s interpretation of Holland that “any 
legislation that rationally implements a valid treaty is equally valid” is 
wrong because it would undermine not only the Constitution, but also 
the very existence of non-self-executing treaties.80 
Finally, Bond states that if Holland does stand to eliminate 
federalism as a check on the Treaty Power, it should be overruled.81 
 
 
 
 
 74.  Id.  
 75.  Id. at 31. 
 76.  Id. 
 77.  Id. 
 78.  Id. 
 79.  Id. 
 80.  Id. at 32. 
 81.  Id. at 33. 
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3. Section 229 Does Not Need to Include Bond’s Actions 
Bond asserts that constitutional avoidance is a “cardinal principle” 
of statutory construction demanding that when one interpretation of 
a statute raises serious constitutional issues, the court should construe 
the statute to avoid those constitutional issues unless it would be 
contrary to Congress’s intent.82 Accordingly, Bond argues that a broad 
reading of “chemical weapon” under § 229 would make it a “federal 
crime to possess bleach or insect repellant while harboring a bad 
intent.”83 Bond argues that this outcome demonstrates how a broad 
reading of § 229 could dangerously intrude on a state’s police power.84 
Therefore, Bond contends the constitutional avoidance principle of 
statutory interpretation should be applied with more force regarding 
§ 229 because it addresses the delicate balance of power between the 
state and federal government.85 
Bond then claims that Congress did not intend to disrupt the 
balance of power between the states and national government when 
passing § 229.86  Instead, Congress intended for § 229 to punish “acts 
of terrorism” by nation-states and “not every malicious use of 
chemicals.”87 As Bond points out, “[n]o one thinks that petitioner’s 
conduct implicated concerns of the Convention.”88 
Rather, Bond contends that the best way to interpret § 229 to 
coincide with Congress’s intent would be to read the “peaceful 
purpose” provision as limiting the statute’s application to non-warlike 
activities.89 This definition of “peaceful purpose” would mean that any 
non-terrorist and non-warlike use of chemicals, like in Bond’s case, 
would fall outside § 229’s scope.90 This interpretation of § 229 would 
avoid unintentional consequences by Congress and prevent § 229 
from exceeding the Convention’s goals.91 Bond supports this 
proposition by demonstrating that this definition of “peaceful 
purpose” coincides with its contextual placement in the statute and in 
the Convention, and it also coincides with its natural meaning.92 
 
 82.  Id. at 42. 
 83.  Id. at 45. 
 84.  Id. at 46.  
 85.  Id. at 43. 
 86.  Id. at 46.  
 87.  Id. at 47. 
 88.  Id. at 49. 
 89.  Id. at 51. 
 90.  Id. at 57.  
 91.  Id. at 51.  
 92.  Id. at 52–53.  
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Further, Bond argues that a non-warlike construction of “peaceful 
purpose” would render § 229 constitutional, and ensure that Bond’s 
use of the chemicals to poison Haynes falls outside § 229’s scope.93 
B. Respondent’s Arguments 
1. Bond Violated § 229 
Respondent, the United States, disagrees with Bond’s definition of 
“peaceful purpose” and instead states that Bond violated the statute 
because Bond’s use of chemicals was not peaceful, but for the specific 
intent of harming Haynes.94 Respondent argues that a natural and 
plain reading of “peaceful purpose” demonstrates that the use of a 
toxic chemical to injure someone is not a “peaceful purpose” but the 
use of a chemical as a “weapon.”95 
Respondent also directly confronts Bond’s argument that § 229’s 
prohibitions should extend to conduct that would violate the 
Convention only if undertaken by a state party.96 Respondent argues 
that even if a state party performed non-warlike revenge acts, the 
state party’s malicious use of a toxic chemical to injure another would 
still be prohibited by the Convention.97 
Further, Respondent counters Bond’s claim that her conduct falls 
outside of § 229 because it was not “warlike” or “terrorist” by stating 
that any interpretation of § 229 that limits its prohibitions to 
“warlike” or “terrorist” activities is foreclosed by its plain text.98 
Rather, Respondent argues that § 229 is purposefully broad and that 
it includes exemptions precisely so that any innocent activities are 
excluded from its reach.99 
Moreover, Respondent asserts that, unlike Bond’s claims, the 
history of the Convention demonstrates it was intended to go beyond 
warlike and terrorist activities.100 Rather, the Convention and § 229 
were intended to prohibit “all malicious use of chemical weapons.”101 
 
 93.  See id. at 56–57 (discussing why defining peaceful purpose as non-warlike will help 
further Congress’s intent and noting that Congress did not mean to regulate the malicious 
actions of a romantic rival).  
 94.  Brief for Respondent at 13, Bond v. United States, No. 12-258 (U.S. Aug. 9, 2013). 
 95.  Id. at 13.  
 96.  Id. at 14. 
 97.  Id.  
 98.  Id. at 11.  
 99.  Id. at 12.  
 100.  Id. at 15.  
 101.  Id. at 16 (emphasis added).  
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Thus, Respondent argues, prohibiting any party, including Bond, from 
using toxic chemicals to injure is entirely consistent with the 
Convention’s goals.102 
2. Section 229 is within Congress’s Power to Implement Treaties 
Respondent concludes by arguing that § 229 is also a proper 
application of Congress’s power to implement treaties.103 Congress has 
the authority to prohibit the malicious use of toxic chemicals, and by 
definition Bond’s conduct, under the Necessary and Proper Clause.104 
Respondent argues that Holland “makes clear” that § 229 is a 
“necessary and proper effectuation of U.S. treaty obligations.”105 
Further, Respondent highlights that all of Bond’s arguments 
attempting to remove local conduct from within the Treaty Power’s 
realm have been made and all have failed.106 
Respondent maintains that procedural safeguards, like the 
requirement that treaties be ratified by two-thirds of the Senate, have 
assured that the delicate balance between state and federal power is 
not disrupted.107 Furthermore, the Senate has always been cognizant 
of federalism concerns and therefore frequently imposes conditions 
on treaties.108 Lastly, Respondent highlights that the Supreme Court 
has never invalidated legislation implementing a treaty due to 
federalism concerns.109 
V. ANALYSIS 
The following subsections detail the different routes that the 
Supreme Court can take when reviewing Bond, and then analyzes 
each routes’ strengths and weaknesses. 
 
 
 
 
 102.  See id. (“State Parties agreed to enact legislation that would prohibit individuals from 
‘undertaking any activity prohibited to a State Party under this Convention.’”). 
 103.  Id. at 26.  
 104.  Id.  
 105.  Id. at 39.  
 106.  Id. at 9.  
 107.  Id.  
 108.  Id. at 47.  
 109.  Id. at 42.  
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A. The Court can Uphold the Third Circuit’s Interpretation of Holland 
and Affirm Bond’s Conviction 
Bond v. United States presents an as-applied challenge to the 
Chemical Weapons Act.110 Although Haynes only sustained a chemical 
burn to her thumb,111 Bond’s actions could have seriously injured 
Haynes and her baby. Therefore, it would be morally unattractive to 
let Bond escape punishment just because her actions do not implicate 
international issues. At oral argument, Justice Kagan in particular 
seemed hesitant to let the severity of Bond’s actions pass as a 
“peaceful purpose” under § 229.112 Justice Kagan illustrated this 
concern by asking what if a chemist released Sarin gas through the 
ducts of his neighbor’s house and ended up killing everyone in the 
house?113 Justice Kagan’s hypothetical, where the neighbor’s use of 
Sarin gas is also completely domestic and does not implicate any 
international concerns, emphasizes the moral unattractiveness of 
letting Bond’s actions go unpunished. This concern weighs in favor of 
upholding the Third Circuit’s intepretation of Holland.  If upheld, 
then § 229 would be constitutionally valid as applied to Bond. 
Would this line of reasoning mean, as Chief Justice Roberts 
questioned, that Congress’s powers “to intrude upon the police 
power” of the states would be “unlimited” when passing legislation to 
implement a treaty?114 Yes. If Holland is allowed to stand as the Third 
Circuit interprets it, the Treaty Power could be used to “undo the 
carefully wrought edifice of a limited government assigned only 
certain enumerated powers.”115 Congress could essentially legislate in 
any area of law when implementing a non-self-executing treaty 
because the legislation will most likely pass the loose rational basis 
scrutiny of the Necessary and Proper Clause. This would effectively 
grant Congress a police power that contradicts our Constitution’s 
delegation of “few and defined” powers to the federal government 
but “numerous and definite” powers to the states.116 
 
 110.  United States v. Bond, 681 F.3d 149 (3d Cir. 2012). 
 111.  United States v. Bond, 581 F.3d 128, 132 (3d Cir. 2009). 
 112.  Transcript of Oral Argument at 14, Bond v. United States, No. 12-158 (U.S. Nov. 5, 
2013). 
 113.  Id. at 14–15. 
 114.  Id. at 43. 
 115.  John C. Eastman, Will Mrs. Bond Topple Missouri v. Holland?, 2011 CATO SUP. CT. 
REV. 185, 202 (2010–11). 
 116.  John R. Crook, ed., Supreme Court Grants Certiorari in Case Implicating Missouri v. 
Holland, 107 AM. J. INT'L L. 432, 434 (2013) (quoting THE FEDERALIST NO. 45 (James 
Madison)).   
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Nonetheless, the massive potential expansion of federal power to 
the derogation of states’ rights, and the lukewarm reception of three 
justices to this prospect, means the Court will most likely reject the 
Third Circuit’s interpretation of Holland but affirm Bond’s 
conviction. 
B. The Court Can Avoid the Constitutional Question All Together 
The facts of Bond distinctly pose the question of whether 
Congress can act beyond its enumerated powers when implementing 
a valid non-self-executing treaty.117 Although the Supreme Court 
could tackle this difficult question, the Court can also avoid it by 
taking one of two routes. 
1. Bond’s Actions Constituted a “Peaceful Purpose” 
First, the Court can hold that § 229 does not apply to Bond. 
Section 229 makes it illegal to “develop, produce, otherwise acquire, 
transfer directly or indirectly, receive, stockpile, retain, own, possess, 
or use, or threaten to use, any chemical weapon.”118 Section 229F then 
defines chemical weapon as “a toxic chemical and its precursors, 
except where intended for a purpose not prohibited under this 
chapter.”119 A toxic chemical is “any chemical which through its 
chemical action on life processes can cause death, temporary 
incapacitation or permanent harm to humans or animals.”120 The term 
“purpose not prohibited under this chapter” includes peaceful 
purposes that are defined as any purpose “related to an industrial, 
agricultural, research, medical, or pharmaceutical activity or other 
activity.”121 
Bond stole the 10–chloro10H–phenoxarsine to poison Haynes 
from Rohm & Haas, a chemical manufacturer.122 Presumably, at the 
time Bond stole the chemicals, Rohm & Haas was manufacturing 
them for a scientific purpose. Therefore, the Court can rule that 
Bond’s actions fall under the “peaceful purpose” provision of 
§229F(7)(a). However, this analysis may prove too much because the 
moment that Bond used the 10-cholor10H-phenoxarsine to poison 
 
 117.  See Eastman, supra note 115, at 201. 
 118.  18 U.S.C.A. § 229(a)(1) (West 2013).  
 119.  18 U.S.C.A. § 229F(1)(a) (West 2013) (emphasis added).  
 120.  § 229F(8)(a). 
 121.  § 229F(7)(a). 
 122.  United States v. Bond, 581 F.3d 128, 131 (3d Cir. 2009). 
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Haynes,123 she was clearly using the chemical to harm to Haynes. Since 
the 10-cholor10H-phenoxarsine had the ability to harm Haynes,124 it 
was clearly a “toxic chemical” as defined under § 229F.125 Bond’s 
attempts at poisoning Haynes,126 therefore, would easily qualify as a 
“use” of a chemical weapon under § 229.127 Quite simply, the language 
of the Chemical Weapons Act is very broad and finding a loophole for 
Bond’s actions would be difficult if not impossible. 
2. Clear Statement Requirement 
Second, the Court can employ a clear statement rule and hold that 
§ 229 does not apply to Bond. The clear statement rule demands that 
if Congress intends to disrupt the constitutional balance between the 
states and the federal government, it must make itself unmistakably 
clear in doing so.128 Therefore, if Congress is not absolutely clear that it 
has intended to preempt traditional state power, the Court will read 
the statute as not disrupting the balance between state and federal 
power. 129 
Here, the Treaty’s Annex lists three “Schedules” of chemicals that 
are absolutely prohibited by the Treaty.130 These listed chemicals are 
not exclusive, however, because the Convention also provides 
information to help place a non-listed chemical into the appropriate 
Schedule.131 Nonetheless as Justice Breyer noted during oral 
argument, “once you depart from the annexes in defining the 
chemicals, you throw into it a list a thousand miles long.”132 Justice 
Breyer also noted that reading § 229 to include chemicals not listed in 
the Annex, like the chemicals Bond used to poison Haynes, can 
encroach on a state’s power to punish its citizens. 
Therefore, the Court can find that § 229 is not clear enough when 
preempting a state’s right to punish its citizen for its “garden variety” 
 
 123.  Id. 
 124.  Id.  
 125.  See § 229F(8)(a) (West 2013) (A toxic chemical is “any chemical which through its 
chemical action on life processes can cause death, temporary incapacitation or permanent harm 
to humans or animals.”). 
 126.  Bond, 581 F.3d at 131. 
 127.  See U.S.C.A. § 229(a)(1) (West 2013); see also § 229F(1)(a).  
 128.  Gregory v. Aschroft, 501 U.S. 452, 461 (1991).  
 129.  Id.  
 130.  Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use 
of Chemical Weapons and their Destruction, supra note 12, at annex. 
 131.  Id. at annex, part IV.  
 132.  Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 112, at 48. 
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crimes and it can decide to apply a clear statement requirement. The 
Court can read § 229 as only being concerned with the chemicals 
specified in the Treaty’s Annex.133 Since the chemicals that Bond used 
to poison Haynes are not on this list,134 the Court can hold that § 229 
does not apply to Bond and reverse her conviction. Justice Breyer 
seemed to favor this argument when he said that limiting § 229 to the 
chemicals listed in the Annex is an “easy way” to determine § 229’s 
scope.135 
C. The Court Can Impose Limitations on Congress’s Powers When 
Implementing a Non-self-Executing Treaty 
Although the Court can take one of the two routes discussed 
above,136 the Court can also decisively end the debate concerning 
Holland’s holding and dictate the appropriate scope of Congress’s 
powers when implementing a non-self-executing treaty. 
When the Holland Court held that when a treaty “is valid there 
can be no dispute about the validity of the statute under Article I, 
Section 8, as a necessary and proper means to execute the powers of 
the Government,”137 it may not have foreseen one particular scenario: 
Congress deviating greatly from a treaty when passing the 
implementing legislation. 
Holland dealt with the constitutionality of the MBTA that was 
passed by Congress to implement the Convention between the 
United States and Great Britain for the Protection of Migratory Birds 
(the Migratory Bird Convention).138 The Migratory Bird Convention’s 
mission was to preserve migratory birds and to save them “from 
indiscriminate slaughter.”139 The MBTA then made it illegal to 
“pursue, hunt, take, capture, kill . . . ship, export, import” or to attempt 
to do the foregoing to “any migratory bird.”140 The rest of the MBTA 
specified the ways in which it was illegal to commit such actions, listed 
exceptions, and included detailed procedures for punishing those who 
 
 133.  Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 68Error! Bookmark not defined., at 26. 
 134.  See United States v. Bond, 581 F.3d 128, 131 (3d Cir. 2009); Convention on the 
Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and 
their Destruction, supra note 12, at art. 1. 
 135.  Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 112, at 35. 
 136.  See supra Part V.B.1–2. 
 137.   252 U.S. 416, 432 (1920). 
 138.  Id. 
 139.  Convention between the United States and Great Britain for the Protection of 
Migratory Birds, supra note 4.  
 140.  16 U.S.C.A. § 703 (West 2013). 
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have committed such crimes.141 The MBTA, therefore, only penalized 
what was specifically stated in the Bird Convention. 
By contrast, § 229 deviates significantly from the Convention. The 
Convention specifically states that its obligations are that each state 
party must promise never: 
To develop, produce, otherwise acquire, stockpile or retain 
chemical weapons, or transfer, directly or indirectly, chemical 
weapons to anyone; 
To use chemical weapons; 
To engage in any military preparations to use chemical weapons; 
To assist, encourage or induce, in any way, anyone to engage in any 
activity prohibited to a State Party under this Convention.142 
The reason for these restrictions is spelled out in the Preamble: 
each State Party is interested in “achieving effective progress towards 
general and complete disarmament.”143 Clearly, the Convention was 
aimed at making sure each sovereign nation involved would refrain 
from any sort of chemical warfare. Section 229 deviates from this 
focus on state parties and instead makes it unlawful for “any person” 
to “develop, produce, otherwise acquire, transfer directly or indirectly, 
receive, stockpile, retain, own, possess, or use, or threaten to use, any 
chemical weapon.”144 Section 229’s focus on individuals goes beyond 
the Convention’s international peacekeeping concerns, and in doing 
so, it heavily encroaches on a state’s right to punish its citizens for 
their crimes. 
The MBTA’s close conformity to its respective treaty is likely 
indicative of treaty legislation at the time Holland was decided. The 
Holland Court probably did not take into account the ever-expanding 
latitude that Congress would later bestow upon itself when passing 
legislation to implement non-self-executing treaties. Therefore, the 
Court should not uphold the Third Circuit’s interpretation of Holland. 
Instead, the Court should determine the true meaning of Holland’s 
holding and also either: (1) create a new nexus test to limit Congress’s 
powers when passing treaty-implementing legislation; or (2) impose a 
subject matter limitation on Congress when passing treaty-
 
 141.  Migratory Bird Treaty Act, 16 U.S.C.A. §§ 703–710 (West 2013).  
 142.  Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use 
of Chemical Weapons and their Destruction, supra note 12, at art. 1.  
 143.  Id. at pmbl.  
 144.  18 U.S.C.A. § 229(a) (West 2013) (emphasis added).  
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implementing legislation. 
 
1. The Court Can Overrule the Third Circuit by Creating a New 
Nexus Test 
Justice Kennedy noted that Bond’s case turns on the breadth of 
the Necessary and Proper Clause when he stated that “[t]he ultimate 
issue of the statute’s validity turns in part on whether the law can be 
deemed ‘necessary and proper for carrying into Execution’ the 
President’s Article II, § 2 Treaty Power.”145 By pointing to the 
Necessary and Proper Clause, Justice Kennedy signaled that the 
broad interpretation given to Holland by the Third Circuit is 
misplaced.146 What, then, is the potential solution? A more radical, yet 
efficient, solution would be for the Court to uphold Holland and 
create a different nexus test for Congress when it uses the Necessary 
and Proper Power in conjunction with the Treaty Power. 
Under current law, the Necessary and Proper Clause grants 
Congress the authority to enact a particular statute as long as that 
statute is “rationally related to the implementation of a 
constitutionally enumerated power.”147 The Necessary and Proper 
Clause, in conjunction with the Third Circuit’s interpretation of 
Holland, allows Congress to pass any legislation as long as it is 
rationally related to a valid treaty. This is a very loose standard that 
grants Congress a large amount of discretion when passing treaty-
implementing legislation. 
If the Court wanted to protect federalism and simultaneously 
maintain the benefit of Holland, which grants Congress powers 
beyond those enumerated to it in the Constitution when 
implementing a treaty, the Court can tighten the nexus test when 
Congress uses the Necessary and Proper Clause to implement a non-
self-executing treaty. Deciphering the new nexus test would not only 
be unprecedented, it would also be very difficult. How tightly would 
the treaty-implementing legislation need to relate to the Convention? 
How closely would a treaty-implementing statute need to track its 
respective treaty? These questions the Court would need to answer. 
 
 
 145.  Bond v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2355, 2367 (2011) (quoting U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8).  
 146.  See Eastman, supra note 115, at 194. 
 147.  United States v. Comstock, 50 U.S. 126, 134 (2010). 
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Although this solution was not proposed during oral arguments, 
tightening the nexus for the Necessary and Proper Clause when used 
to implement a non-self-executing treaty is a great solution. First, it 
maintains the benefit of Holland and allows Congress to legislate 
beyond its enumerated powers when implementing a treaty. Second, it 
would avoid the trouble of having to overrule Holland, which has 
persisted for decades. Third, it would require Congress to more tightly 
connect treaty-implementing legislation to the respective treaty and 
therefore protect states’ rights by diminishing the likelihood that 
Congress encroaches on state authority. 
Fourth, a tighter standard would help avoid overbroad treaty 
implementing statutes that lead to absurd results. For example, Justice 
Alito pointed out during oral argument that “pouring a bottle of 
vinegar in [a] friend’s goldfish bowl” would be illegal under § 229 and 
expose a person to several years in federal prison.148  Section 229’s 
overbroad language can penalize a variety of actions that were not 
targeted by the Convention. This is a direct consequence of Holland 
because treaty implementing legislation only needs to meet 
deferential rational basis review. A tighter nexus test when Congress 
uses its Necessary and Proper Power to implement a non-self-
executing treaty, on the other hand, would require Congress to more 
narrowly tailor treaty-implementing legislation to its respective treaty. 
Under the new nexus test, Congress would be required to pass 
legislation to implement a treaty but Congress could not go any 
further than what is necessary to implement the treaty. 
Here, a tighter nexus test would result in overruling the Third 
Circuit’s interpretation of Holland’s holding. Also, it would most 
probably mean that § 229 is unconstitutional as applied to Bond and 
Bond’s conviction would need to be reversed. This would all depend, 
however, on what the Court would determine is an appropriate nexus 
between a treaty and its implementing legislation and whether the 
Chemical Weapons Act is appropriately related to the Convention. 
 
 
 
 148.  Transcript of Oral Argument at 29, Bond v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2355 (2011) (No. 
09-1227).  
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2. The Court Can Overrule the Third Circuit by Creating a 
Subject Matter Limitation 
Second, the Court can impose a subject matter limitation on 
Congress’s powers when used in conjunction with the Treaty Power. 
Under this solution if Congress wanted to pass legislation 
implementing a treaty that would exceed the treaty’s scope, it would 
only be allowed to do so if it was still regulating a matter of 
international concern. This solution, like the tighter nexus test 
proposed above,149 would protect states’ rights by diminishing the 
opportunity for Congress to encroach on traditional state power. 
However, the subject matter limitation also has its setbacks. First, 
imposing a subject matter limitation would go against the ideals of the 
Framers who desired a broad and substantive Treaty Power.150  
Second, in today’s world almost any issue “can plausibly be labeled 
‘international’”151 and the definition of an “international” issue will 
“undoubtedly vary over time, as world conditions and relationships 
between nations change.”152 Therefore, placing a subject matter 
limitation on treaty-implementing legislation may prove to be more 
difficult than it seems. 
Nonetheless, this solution would mean that the Third Circuit’s 
interpretation of Holland would need to be overruled. Further, it 
would mean that § 229 is unconstitutional as applied to Bond because 
Bond’s prosecution does not implicate international concerns. Bond’s 
prosecution is not of concern to the Convention’s parties, and if the 
United States had not prosecuted Bond, it would not have been in 
violation of the Convention. Therefore, under this solution, the 
Chemical Weapons Act would be unconstitutional to the extent that it 
criminalizes purely domestic behavior that does not affect the United 
States’ obligations under the Convention. 
 
 
 
 149.  See supra Part V.C.1. 
 150.  Oona A. Hathaway, Spencer Amdur, Celia Choy, Samir Deger-Sen, John Paredes, 
Sally Pei, & Haley Nix Proctor, The Treaty Power: Its History, Scope, and Limits, 98 CORNELL 
L. REV. 239, 245 (2013). 
 151.  Curtis A. Bradley, The Treaty Power and American Federalism, 97 MICH. L. REV. 390, 
451–52 (1998).  
 152.  Id. at 454. 
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D. The Court Can Overrule Holland and Confine Congress’s Powers 
The last, and least likely route that the Court can take is to 
overrule Holland.  The Court can hold that non-self-executing treaties 
can only regulate domestically to the extent that Congress has the 
constitutional authority to do so. The Treaty Power, therefore, would 
not confer on Congress any additional regulatory powers.153 This 
would be a radical step toward protecting the federalist principles the 
Framers adamantly sought to preserve. This is very unlikely, however, 
because this approach is a “novel proposition” with “few adherents 
and little legal support.”154 Further, this option did not garner a lot of 
support during oral argument.155 
If the Court did take this route, it could rule § 229 unconstitutional 
as exceeding Congress’s Constitutional authority and Bond’s 
conviction would be reversed. On the other hand, if the Court 
considers § 229 constitutional, then Bond’s conviction would be 
affirmed. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
A five-page opinion published over ninety years ago has spurred a 
tremendous amount of debate concerning the scope of Congress’s 
powers when implementing valid non-self-executing treaties. Bond v. 
United States provides an ideal set of facts that nicely present the 
Supreme Court with an opportunity to definitively dictate Congress’s 
powers when implementing a non-self-executing treaty and therefore 
to decisively end the debate concerning Holland.156 
 
 
 153.  Id. at 456.  
 154.  Oona et al., supra note 150, at 283.  
     155.   See generally Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 112. 
 156.  581 F.3d 128 (3d Cir. 2009).  
